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I N MAY1964, THEAFL-CIO LEADERSHIP INVITED the head of the South Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT), Tran Quoc Buu, to Washington and arranged a one-on-one meeting with President 
Lyndon johnson. At the White House, Buu told johnson 
that the "missing link in the present Vietnamese chain 
of events," was a free Vietnamese labor movement ca-
pable of addressing the "daily hardships" suffered by the 
country's workers. AFL-CIO President George Meany, 
who also attended the Oval Office meeting, and Buu 
both hoped to convince the President not only of the 
necessity of U.S. intervention-but more importantly the 
necessity of the right kind of intervention. What the two 
union leaders envisioned was an American engagement 
that would place equal weight on economic, social, and 
political reform as on the military struggle. Impressed, 
Johnson readily agreed that the problems of South Viet-
nam were as much political as military in nature. 1 
The Buu meeting was the most visible example of AFL-
CIO on-going assistance to the Vietnamese labor move-
ment. As the war in Asia expanded and divided the 
country, it proved to be a costly ordeal for American 
union leaders and union members. Despite public alle-
giance to governmental endeavors in Vietnam over several 
presidential administrations, Meany and his supporters 
tried to pursue independent policies and programs in 
the troubled Southeast Asian country. American labor 
hoped-unrealistically as it turned out-that if it could 
build strong independent unions in Vietnam, a middle 
way would be constructed between the repression of the 
South Vietnamese state and the horrors of communism. 
The American labor movement was not a latecomer 
to the problems in Southeast Asia. In the early 1950s, 
the AFL was eager to help the Third World construct 
free trade unions and other institutions as part of its anti-
communist campaign. At a planning session for the newly 
formed International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) in 1950, Irving Brown, the European-
based AFL representative, pressed the organization to 
send a delegation to French Indo-China, insisting that 
he could "think of no more pressing task than organiz-
ing in Southeast Asia." A preliminary ICFTU task force 
that included American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Secretary-Treasurer 
Gordon Chapman and United Mine Workers of America 
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From twenty-two provinces, men and women of the CVT's Fish-
ermen Union attend a twenty-five day training seminar, Febru-
ary 1969. 
(UMWA) official john Brophy swept through Southeast 
Asia later that year. Their Asian survey included a brief 
visit to Vietnam. There, the group saw evidence of ana-
scent labor movement. Officials of the French colonial 
government assured the delegation that trade union 
rights soon would be extended to all Vietnamese work-
ers.2 
Labor issues long had been of concern to the Viet-
namese nationalist movement. Their French colonial 
overlords had created some of the worst labor conditions 
in the world-especially on the country's rubber planta-
tions, where workers toiled in virtual slavery. Influenced 
by Chinese and Soviet communists, the language of la-
bor exploitation quickly took hold of the nationalist 
movement. The future leader of South Vietnam's labor 
movement, Buu, was well schooled in such language. He 
eagerly joined the Viet Minh movement, fighting French 
colonial control and, when captured by the French, serv-
ing prison time alongside future leaders of North Viet-
nam. By the late 1940s, however, Buu and others grew 
disillusioned with the violence and excesses of the Viet 
Minh, a movement they came to suspect had more to 
do with communism than genuine nationalism. Al-
though a Buddhist himself, Buu began working with 
French Catholic trade unionists to build an independent 
labor movement for native workers-activity strictly for-
bidden by French colonial law. Buu eagerly welcomed 
the American visitors in 1950, hoping that they might 
provide leverage as he dealt with French officials. 
Over the next several years, as the French struggled 
to retain control over Vietnam, colonial authorities al-
lowed Buu's movement increasing freedom. In 1953, he 
christened his now-legal organization the Vietnamese 
Confederation ofLabor. The organization quickly grew, 
but the Viet Minh victory over the French at Dien Bien 
Phu in 1954 put the CVT's progress injeopardy. At the 
international Geneva Conference dealing with Southeast 
Asia that same year, the AFL advocated the immediate 
end ofFrench colonial rule and the formation of a genu-
inely nationalist army to fight the Viet Minh. 3 vVhen the 
conference ignored the AFL's efforts and divided Viet-
nam along the seventeenth parallel, George Meany, 
president of the AFL, bitterly assailed the action as "ap-
peasement" on "a world scale which would make Munich 
pale into insignificance. "4 
As a result of the Geneva Conference decision, the 
CVT faced grave challenges. Thousands of its members 
worked above the seventeenth parallel and feared retri-
bution from the Viet Minh. Buu called on international 
labor for help resettling trade unionists fleeing from the 
north. For a time, hundreds of refugees, with no other 
place to go, camped out in the CVT headquarters in 
Saigon. By 1956, as the division of Vietnam became a 
reality, the newly created AFL-CIO struggled to aid the 
CVT, now centered in South Vietnam. But with limited 
resources and other pressing labor situations around the 
world, American labor could offer little help. The 
Eisenhower administration, meanwhile, seeking to hold 
the line on military and foreign aid spending, resisted 
AFL-CIO calls for U.S. government support for the CVT. 
Nevertheless, in 1956, the U.S. Operations Mission in 
Saigon did hire Jodie Eggers (formerly of the CIO's In-
ternational Woodworkers of America) as its labor advi-
sor. Eggers went to work immediately establishing strong 
bonds with the CVT. The new labor advisor even spent 
his weekends building homes for resettled CVT mem-
bers. Despite the promise he saw in the new organiza-
tion, soon he reported tensions between the CVT and 
the South Vietnamese government of President Ngo 
Dinh Diem had begun to spiral out of control due to 
the labor organization's pressure on the government to 
democratize the country. When the U.S. government 
reassigned Eggers to Pakistan in 1958, the labor aid pro-
gram he devised quickly disintegrated but the problems 
remained.5 
By the start of the 1960s, rumors swirled throughout 
Saigon that Buu would be the next in a long line of CVT 
officials imprisoned by President Diem. In 1961, con-
cerned about the deteriorating situation, Meany dis-
patched international affairs expert Irving Brown to 
Saigon. Brown quickly recognized a grave situation. "Un-
less there is a cleansing of the Augean stables and an 
introduction of new, hopeful political elements into the 
regime, the masses, especially the peasants-will not de-
fend the regime no matter what this government or the 
USA says," concluded Brown. Meeting with Buu and 
other members of the CVT, he became increasingly con-
vinced that the CVT was just the sort of organization that 
could help democratize the nation.6 Returning to his of-
fice in Paris, Brown met frequently over the next avo 
years with Vietnamese exiles opposed to Diem. He used 
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Members ofTranspmt Workers' Union, Local500 of Pan Ameri-
can Airways in Miami, Florida, prepare to load 3, 000 Christ-
mas gifts for soldiers in Vietnam made possible by union-raised 
contributions. This was one of numerous union projects such 
as the Communication Workers of America-sponsored "Call Mom, " 
which provided free telephone service to G.I.s in Vietnam. 
his contacts to arrange for meetings between dissidents 
and high-ranking U.S. officials. Meanwhile, in Vietnam, 
while still cautious, Buu grew more outspoken in his criti-
cisms of Diem. In early November 1963, a coup led by 
South Vietnamese generals finally ended the oppressive 
Diem regime. But the CVT remained vulnerable and Buu 
went into hiding to avoid possible arrest, as further coups 
and leadership changes brought only greater instability. 
Seeking to provide Buu with much needed leverage and 
eager to bring the plight of the cvr to the attention of 
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President Johnson, the AFL-CIO brought Buu to Wash-
ington, D.C. in 1964. 
Buu's meeting with Johnson emboldened the CVT 
leader, who returned to a South Vietnam increasingly 
descending into chaos. Protests against the government 
had virtually paralyzed the capital city of Saigon. When 
the South Vietnamese government tried to impose new 
restrictions on public meetings that would severely ham-
per labor organizing, Buu announced a general strike 
to protest the restrictions. George Meany immediately 
sent Buu a telegram, expressing "our all-out unstinting 
support to the free and independent workers organized 
in the CVT under your great leadership." U.S. Embassy 
officials, however, shared none of Meany's enthusiasm. 
They worried that the "general strike was an extreme re-
action and another example of national indiscipline."' 
On September 21, 1964, workers throughout Saigon 
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The seafood market at the docks of Phan Thiet, 1968. During 
the war years, thousands of Vietnamese fishermen worked the 
waters of this coastal city and many were members of the CVT's 
Fishermen Union. Since 1975, however, they can no longer count 
on the support of an independent trade union. 
walked off their jobs and joined in a march to the presi-
dential palace to demand a change in policy. The city 
was effectively shut down. 
Intimidated by the CVT's show of force, the South 
Vietnamese government agreed to drop restrictions on 
public gatherings and met other demands. But Buu did 
not have long to bask in his success. Only weeks after 
the strike, government officials arrested the CVT presi-
dent on charges of conspiring in a coup against the South 
Vietnamese leadership. Meany-infuriated at the ar-
rest-drafted a caustic statement denouncing the gov-
ernment of South Vietnam for its "inhuman and 
destructive action in trumping up treason charges against 
Buu."8 The AFL-CIO's pressure paid off, and Buu was 
acquitted of all charges. Still, it was clear that while the 
CVT had potential, it also had enemies. South Vietnam-
ese labor found itself caught awkwardly between the re-
pressive government of South Vietnam and the 
dangerous insurgent Viet Cong guerrillas, increasingly 
controlling the countryside. As one CVT official put it, 
we were "pinched between a mountain and a river." 
Despite the obstacles faced by Vietnamese labor, both 
the CVT and AFL-CIO felt confident that labor could 
make a difference in Vietnam-serving as a vehicle for 
social, economic, and political reform. Thus, in the sum-
mer of 1965, when Presidentjohnson made the deci-
sion to greatly expand the U.S. role in Vietnam with 
thousands of American combat troops, the AFL-CIO an-
nounced its "unstinting" support for the intervention. 
American labor leaders reasoned that only U.S. troops 
could provide the much-needed stability for the south 
and thwart the communist insurgents who often targeted 
CVT organizers for retribution. 
American organized labor, however, was not totally 
unified in support of Johnson's move. The 1965 AFL-
CIO convention showed early evidence of dissention and 
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division. Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto-
mobile Workers (UAW) and president of the AFL-CIO's 
Industrial Union Department, helped to rewrite a reso-
lution in support of the war that he considered need-
lessly strident. UAW Vice President Emil Mazey rose to 
denounce the South Vietnamese government as "a cor-
rupt military dictatorship," unworthy of American sup-
port. Student anti-war protesters in the visitor's gallery 
created a disturbance when Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
arrived to address the convention. These episodes fore-
shadowed growing debate within the house oflabor and 
throughout the country.9 
Over the next several years, the AFL-CIO leadership 
continued to support the war and seek to build up the 
CVT in Vietnam. The American intervention created an 
economic boom in South Vietnam, and the AFL-CIO 
leaned on the U.S. government to lean on American 
firms employing hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese 
workers in order that CVT unions receive recognition. 
Under these artificially created conditions, CVT unions 
prospered. Gains were made not only organizing con-
struction and other urban workers, but also among the 
CVT's rural unions, which included tenant farmers and 
plantation workers. Inspired by President johnson's op-
timistic reports, the AFL-CIO felt confident that the war 
could be won. 
Increasingly, however, with college deferments avail-
able to the middle class who could afford ever growing 
tuition costs, it proved to be the sons of working people 
who did much of the fighting in Vietnam-and suffered 
most of the casualties. This accelerated division in the 
labor movement. Internal polls taken by various unions 
showed deteriorating support for the war, and anti-war 
trade unionists were growing more outspoken. On 
Veteran's Day, November 11, 1967, peace-minded union 
leaders organized the National Labor Assembly for 
Peace, a national conference for trade unionists opposed 
Workers manufacturing burlap bags in a Saigon factory, Jlvfarch 
1970. Although primarily an agrarian country, some light in-
dustry existed in Vietnam. The CVT aimed to organize workers 
in urban industrial and service sectors and in rural areas on 
plantations and farms. Building unions outside cities proved 
ve1y dangerous since organizers were likeZy to encounter the dan-
gerous Viet Gong forces. 
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to the war. Meany and his supporters considered such 
actions counterproductive to the war effort and de-
nounced the planners of the conference in no uncer-
tain terms. 
The turning point for American labor in Vietnam 
came, as it did for the rest of the country, in the pivotal 
year of 1968. The AFL-CIO's hopes that progress would 
continue in Vietnam and opposition might be held in 
check at home, quickly collapsed in the early weeks of 
1968. General Nguyen Loan, head of South Vietnam's 
national police force, long had viewed the CVT as a 
group of troublemakers, whom he unfairly suspected was 
infiltrated by the communist Viet Cong. In early Janu-
ary 1968, when the CVT-affiliated electrical workers 
launched a strike against the South Vietnamese govern-
ment which owned Saigon's major power plant, Loan 
had had enough. He surrounded the CVT headquarters 
in Saigon with trucks loaded with armed police, who then 
marched workers forcibly back to their jobs. Loan also 
arrested several high-ranking CVT officials as they con-
ducted negotiations in the labor ministry's offices. 
The violent strikebreaking infuriated the AFL-CIO. 
But the federation resisted making a public stand against 
Loan's actions. CVT leaders had made clear to their 
American counterparts that South Vietnamese labor 
must appear an autonomous force, not dependent on 
outsiders. Such autonomy was deeply valued in a coun-
try with a long and painful colonial past. Of course, no 
such true independence was possible in the complicated 
and dangerous political environment of South Vietnam, 
but the legitimacy of an organization like the CVT re-
quired it to strive to maintain at least a fa~ade of au-
tonomy. Alongside these concerns, the AFL-CIO feared 
that any attacks on the South Vietnamese government 
would play into the hands of anti-war protesters, eager 
to draw attention to the undemocratic nature of 
America's allies. Thus the AFL-CIO maintained an awk-
ward public silence on the arrests. To labor's critics, both 
the CVT and the AFL-CIO appeared impotent in the face 
of the crisis. Behind the scenes, however, Meany and oth-
ers pressed the Johnson administration to lean on South 
Vietnamese officials to address the situation. Finally-
just before the Vietnamese New Year holiday of Tet-
under pressure from the American ambassador, the 
South Vietnamese government settled the strike andre-
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leased the remaining jailed labor leaders. 
Only days later, Viet Cong guerillas attacked South 
Vietnam's major cities, in the process targeting working-
class neighborhoods for propaganda campaigns and CVT 
officials for assassination. Violence destroyed the homes 
of more than 1,000 members of the CVT. In the midst 
of the battle, the entire world was allowed a glimpse of 
the brutality of General Loan, the chief of police, when 
he summarily executed a suspected terrorist in front of 
cameramen. 10 
In the wake of the attack, the AFL-CIO attempted to 
put the best face on events, announcing that "the ter-
rorist campaign has only hardened the resolve of Viet-
namese labor to resist terror and oppression," and 
offering emergency funds to help rebuild CVT losses. 
AFL-CIO International Affairs Department Director Jay 
Lovestone, however, recognized that, while the VietCong 
maneuver had fallen short of its objective of cracking 
the South Vietnam regime, the tide had shifted. 
Lovestone wrote to Meany that the Americans had "un-
derestimated the strength of the enemy." And he ac-
knowledged, "What has happened is no doubt a political 
blow to us. "11 
But even the end of the Tet Offensive brought no 
peace for the CVT. When violence subsided, General 
Loan rearrested two CVT leaders-including the CVT 
general secretary. Again the AFL-CIO applied pressure 
behind the scenes-bluntly informing state department 
officials that it would publicly condemn the South Viet-
namese government unless the jailed labor leaders were 
released. While the American ambassador managed to 
gain the release of the general secretary, the other CVT 
official continued to languish in jail. Finally, the AFL-
CIO dispatched its most effective negotiator, Irving 
Brown, to Saigon. There he arranged a lengthy meeting 
with General Loan. No doubt Brown, who had a reputa-
tion for ruthlessness and CIA ties, was characteristically 
blunt, perhaps even threatening during the encounter. 
Forty-eight hours after his confrontation with Brown, 
Loan released the remaining CVT official in custody. 12 
The release, however, could have brought little satis-
faction to either the CVT or the AFL-CIO. The events of 
the first three months of 1968 did much to dash the ac-
cumulated optimism of many years. The arrests and 
strikebreaking belied the fa~ade of South Vietnamese 
Thousands flee from the working-class area of Saigon, known 
as Cholon, during the Viet Cong guerilla attack during the Tet 
Vietnamese holiday, January 1968. CVT leaders, including 
Tran Quae Buu, maintained high visibility during the Tet Of 
fensive and the insurgents received little support from neighbor-
hoods such as Cholon. The attack did, however, weaken the 
commitment of the American public to the long overseas war. 
democracy that the United States had so patiently and 
expensively erected. The AFL-CIO's willingness to sup-
port President Nguyen Van Thieu's authoritarian gov-
ernment-even if only with silence-suggested a narrow 
dogmatism to many onlookers. For the CVI, the illusion 
upon which South Vietnamese labor built much of its 
success was also greatly damaged. 
Things also deteriorated in the U.S. for the AFL-CIO. 
Under fire from anti-war challengers, President Johnson, 
with whom labor leaders had grown remarkably close, 
withdrew from the presidential race in March of 1968. 
Meany personally appealed to Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey to enter the race-to prevent a complete col-
lapse of the liberal anti-communism agenda. Humphrey, 
burdened by the increasingly unpopular war and suffer-
ing through the traumatic and violent Chicago conven-
tion, slogged into the general election with few 
enthusiastic supporters-other than the AFL-CIO. 
Thanks to the federation's unprecedented devotion of 
resources, the vice president almost won a very close elec-
tion. But in the end, Vietnam defeated Humphrey, and 
the AFL-CIO was now faced with President Richard 
Nixon. 
Despite deep misgivings, Meany moved to establish a 
working relationship with the new President. The AFL-
CIO president, no doubt, appreciated Nixon's hawkish 
stand on the war, but he had a more particular reason 
to work with Nixon. In cooperation with the Johnson 
administration, the AFL-CIO had created the Asian 
American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI) in 1968. AAFLI 
was to be an independent organization to promote free, 
western-style unions in Asia-particularly in Vietnam, 
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Some of the 100, 000 construction workers, longshoremen, and 
other workers rally at City Hall and surrounding streets in New 
York City, chanting "U S.A. all the way" in support of the mili-
tary effort in Vietnam, May 20, 1970. Peter J Brennan, presi-
dent of the Construction Trades Council of Greater New York 
and Thomas (Teddy) Gleason, president of the International 
Longshoremen's Association addressed the crowd. A1indful of 
the violent confrontation between "hardhats" and "peaceniks" 
at the same location two weeks earlier, Gleason remarked: "We 
want peace as much as the others want it, but we want an hon-
orable peace. " 
where it would work to aid the CVf. The Agency for In-
ternational Development (AID) was to fund the institu-
tion, loosely under the direction of the AFL-CIO. Nixon's 
support was crucial to maintaining AID funding for 
AAFLI. 
Meanwhile, the never-ending war continued to create 
division within the ranks of labor's leadership. Walter 
Reuther, an early supporter of the war, had come to view 
the engagement as a costly impediment to social progress 
and, by the time of his death in 1970, had become an 
outspoken critic of the conflict. That same year, Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers President Jacob Potofsky la-
mented that the country was "beset by a host of 
problems," and the war in Vietnam "underlies practically 
all our troubles."13 
At the grassroots level, anti-war sentiment and activity 
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grew, fueled in large part by the heavy casualty rate and 
toll taken on the lives of young men from working neigh-
borhoods. Patriotism loomed large in blue-collar house-
holds. Many anti-war trade unionists found themselves 
uncomfortable with the excesses of the peace movement. 
Flag burnings and disloyal rhetoric offended many of the 
socially more conservative labor activists. At the national 
level, Meany and others held the increasingly radical 
peace movement in utter contempt. In New York City, 
resentment spilled over into violence on May 8, 1970, 
when construction workers-"hardhats" as they quickly 
became known-attacked anti-war protesters, demon-
strating against Nixon's invasion of Cambodia. 
Nixon hoped that his support for the war and overt 
appeals to working people might lure trade unionists into 
the Republican Party. Meany and most in organized la-
bor were unmoved by the president's transparent efforts. 
But Meany and his supporters continued to believe in 
the war, and remained committed to their vision of the 
CVf as a democratizing force in Vietnam. When the 
economy, once robust with growth, began to show signs 
of weakness-caused in part by the expense of the war 
in Southeast Asia-the AFL-CIO did vigorously attack 
Nixon's erratic efforts to promote recovery. Still, on the 
issue of Vietnam, the AFL-CIO could always be counted 
on to support the president. 
As in the United States, economic problems also af-
flicted South Vietnam. Nixon's Vietnamization plan-
Hunter P. Wharton, president of the Operating Engineers (tall-
est individual); Ben Sharman, International Affairs Represen-
tative, Operating Engineers (bach row, wearing conventional 
eyeglasses); Morris Paladino, Asian American Free Labor In-
stitute (wearing sunglasses); and joseph Davis, president, Wash-
ington State AFL-CIO (wearing sunglasses and carrying coat) 
meeting with Vietnamese dock workers and dedicating a hiring 
hall for the port of Saigon to replace the old hiring system domi-
nated by gangsters and corrupt government officials, July 197 3. 
Also during their visit to Vietnam, the AFL-CIO delegation put 
pressure on President Thieu to release jailed unionists. 
in which South Vietnamese troops gradually were to re-
place American forces-meant a slowing of U.S. invest-
ment, financial support that had created the bubble 
upon which the CVT built much of its support. Unem-
ployment became an increasing problem for the CVT. 
South Vietnamese unions, after many years of successes, 
began losing strikes. Labor-state relations, while an im-
provement over 1968, remained far from ideal. Privately, 
Buu complained endlessly that President Thieu had no 
social vision nor sense of how organized labor might 
strengthen the struggling country. Meanwhile, the war 
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entered a dangerous new phase. The Viet Cong, frus-
trated by setbacks, launched a terror campaign. On Sep-
tember 21, 1971, two kilos of VC-planted dynamite 
rocked CVT headquarters where Buu lived in a small 
apartment. The CVT president narrowly escaped with 
his life.14 
As the election ofl972 approached, the AFL-CIO lead-
ership faced the unhappy choice between an untrustwor-
thy president, whose domestic policies they despised and 
the anti-war candidacy of Senator George McGovern, 
whose election would doom any hopes for the future of 
the labor federation in South Vietnam. To complicate 
matters, that same summer in St. Louis, a group of union-
ists opposed to the war held a convention and established 
an organization called Labor for Peace. In the end, the 
AFL-CIO avoided endorsing a presidential candidate but 
several unions did split with the leadership and formed 
the National Labor Committee for the Election of 
McGovern-Shriver. 
Mter McGovern's overwhelming defeat, the American 
economy slid into a deep recession the following year, 
one marked by a frightening stagflation-rising inflation 
and unemployment. Mutual distrust marred labor's re-
lationship with the Nixon administration, but liberals in 
Congress distanced themselves from the federation due 
to the war issue. The AFL-CIO carefully mapped out a 
full-employment-based recovery plan, but few were lis-
tening. 
In January 1973, Nixon announced that he had finally 
achieved "peace with honor." In Vietnam, however, Bun 
recognized that "peace with honor" was hardly what 
Nixon was offering his country; still he hoped that the 
American withdrawal would finally allow South Vietnam 
to escape the specter of being America's puppet. With 
the departure of the Americans, Buu talked of an "awak-
ening of the conscience of the masses"-his hope that 
the indifferent and long-suffering peasants and workers 
of Vietnam would rally to the anti-communist cause-
now that it was no longer tainted by the overwhelming 
presence of the Americans. 15 
The American withdrawal, however, also meant a se-
vere erosion of American leverage over the South Viet-
nam state-support that had often protected the CVT. 
Well aware of this, Meany arranged a personal meeting 
with President Thieu during the South Vietnamese 
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president's state visit to Washington in March 1973. At 
the Blair House meeting, Meany subtly but clearly ex-
plained that his support for continuing appropriations 
for South Vietnam(the AFL-CIO was one of the few po-
litical forces still behind American aid) depended on 
Thien's treatment of the CVT. The South Vietnamese 
president seemed to understand. 16 
In the months that followed, however, Thieu tight-
ened control over his country. That summer, in response 
to a labor strike, Thieu imprisoned several labor lead-
ers, including the presidents of four major unions. Again 
the AFL-CIO attempted to pressure the state department, 
but the American government had lost much of its in-
fluence. Finally, Meany dispatched a high-profile AFL-
CIO delegation to Saigon to negotiate the release of the 
jailed unionists. The group included Hunter Wharton, 
president of the Operating Engineers Union, Benjamin 
Sharman, the international affairs representative for the 
International Association of Machinists, and Morris 
Paladino, the new director of AAFLI. The delegation, 
meeting with Thieu, reminded the president of his prom-
ise to Meany. Thieu still insisted on bringing the labor 
leaders to trial and convicting them, but he later released 
the prisonersY 
Ironically, the CVT-despite problems with Thieu-
was enjoying some real successes. South Vietnamese la-
bor had lobbied for and helped implement the 
Land-to-Tiller Act-a far-reaching land redistribution 
program, aimed at shifting ownership of millions of acres 
from landlords to tenants. In addition, the CVT formed 
its own political party (in part to lobby for land reform). 
The CVT's Worker-Farmer Party managed to navigate 
the complicated and dangerous political waters of South 
Vietnam and make initial inroads. 
But the hour was already too late. By early 1975, the 
North Vietnamese Army began a full-scale invasion of 
the south. South Vietnamese appeals for American aid 
fell largely on deaf ears in Congress, but the AFL-CIO 
still had enough clout to arrange meetings for Buu. He 
arrived in Washington, D.C. on March 15, 1975, for a 
desperate round oflobbying on behalf of his government 
and met with Senators Henry Jackson and Edward 
Kennedy in addition to President Gerald Ford in the 
White House. "v\lhatever you can do, do it quickly," 
pleaded Buu at the close of the meeting with Ford. But 
' 
f 
Former Vietnamese tenant farmers examine the land titles to 
their new property, 1970. Pressured by the CVT and the AFL-
CIO, the South Vietnam government had launched sweeping 
land reform covering three million acres. Unlike the communist 
ajJjJroach to the distribution of pmperty, the government pro-
vided landlords with some compensation. 
aid was not forthcoming and probably would not have 
helped. 18 
In April, as South Vietnam began to topple, Meany 
contacted the U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, Graham Mar-
tin, to ask that cvr labor leaders be included in any 
evacuation plans. 19 The end came sooner and more dra-
matically than Martin could have imagined. With North 
Vietnamese troops surrounding Saigon in late April, the 
evacuation plan finally was set in motion. Endangered 
cvr officers and their families were to gather at an ap-
pointed site and time, board buses, and be transported 
to the Saigon airport. But when the evacuation order fi-
nally came, the invading troops had destroyed the air-
port. There was only room for Buu in the helicopter 
airlift from the U.S. embassy. The rest of the CVT offic-
ers were to be left behind. Miraculously, the American 
embassy labor attache, Emil Lindahal-who before en-
tering state department service was a member ofiUE Lo-
cal450, Long Island-managed to find a boat in Saigon 
harbor willing to take the group. In the last desperate 
hours of South Vietnam, the CVT members drifted out 
into the South China Sea. On board, they listened to ra-
dio reports announcing the fall of Saigon and, omi-
nously, heard many of their names read as among those 
ordered to report to the authorities. Mter three days, 
the group arrived in the Philippines and eventually made 
their way to a refugee encampment in Guam. There, the 
cvr officers and their families were reunited with Buu. 
The group later moved on to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 
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John Eisenhower (far left), son of the former president and chair-
man of President Gerald Ford's Advisory Committee on Refit-
gees; labor community services representatives; and Pennsylvania 
state officials visit the Vietnamese refugee center in Indiantown 
Gap, Pennsylvania, temporary home to 11,500 individuals, 
September 1975. George Meany served on the Presidential Ad-
visory Committee and the AFL-CIO took a lead in helping re-
settle thousands of refugees throughout the United States. 
where AAFLI and the AFL-CIO Department of Commu-
nity Services worked to find them sponsors in the United 
States. Trade unionists to the end, one of the first tasks 
for the group in Arkansas was to organize into commit-
tees to delegate duties, represent interests, and air griev-
ances.20 
The fall of Saigon, however, did not bring an end to 
the war for American labor. With thousands ofVietnam-
ese refugees flowing into the United States at a time when 
unemployment was edging upwards toward 10%, many 
Americans resented the added burden-especially after 
the painful war. But the AFL-CIO insisted that a debt 
was owed. Meany accepted a high-profile position on the 
seventeen-member presidential advisory committee on 
resettlement of Vietnamese refugees. He also commit-
ted the AFL-CIO Community Services Department to 
helping with the resettlement, dedicated federation 
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funds to the cause, and asked all federation locals and 
affiliates to help in finding jobs for the refugees. As if 
the nightmare of Vietnam would never end, some em-
ployers began hiring Vietnamese refugees as strikebreak-
ers. Meany angrily threatened to resign from the 
presidential advisory committee unless the White House 
took action, which was quickly forthcoming. 21 
Members of the CVT who were not lucky enough to 
escape Vietnam paid a high price for their union activi-
ties. Many spent long years in "reeducation camps." To-
day, there is no free labor movement in Vietnam. Like 
many nations in the region, Vietnam seems to have com-
bined the worst of capitalism and communism-result-
ing in some of the most exploitive labor conditions in 
the world. 
Prior to the final fall ofVietnam, Meany reflected back 
over labor's longest war. In 197 4 on the Dick Cavett tele-
vision program, Meany, referring to his support of 
Johnson and Nixon on Vietnam, confessed, "Ifl' d known 
then what I know now I don't think we would have 
backed them." He later qualified his comments some-
what, explaining that while "the American people were 
not told the truth as to the actual conduct of the war, 
the prospects for Vietnamization, etc .... my fundamen-
tal belief in the role of the United States as the chief 
defender of freedom has not changed one bit. "22 ll 
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